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Was Money Really Easy Under Greenspan? 
BY DAVID R. HENDERSON AND JEFFREY ROGERS HUMMEL 
to, 
F
or mer Federal Reserve chairman Alan Greenspan 
has become everyone's favorite scapegoat. His 
policies allegedly caused, or at least contributed 
the current financial crisis. He is attacked from the 
left for lax financial regulation, from the right for loose 
monetary policy, and from the middle for both. Yet 
two years ago, on leaving office, 
Greenspan was widely heralded as a 
financial wizard whose wise, discre­
tionary macromanagement had 
brought an unprecedented two 
decades of low inflation, high pros­
perity, and infrequent and mild 
recessions. Both viewpoints, in real­
ity, are mistaken. 
During the Keynesian dark ages 
persisting through the mid-1970s, 
no one-except a few monetary 
cranks and monetarist economists 
cloistered in their academic ivory 
towers-believed that the Federal 
Reserve's monetary policy even 
mattered. This was a period when 
Paul Samuelson, who would go on to wm the 1970 
Nobel Prize in economics the second time it was 
awarded, could proclaim in a 1969 Newsweek column 
that "there is no sight in the world more awful than 
that of an old-time economist, foam-flecked at the 
mouth and hell-bent to cure inflation by monetary dis­
cipline. God willing, we shan't soon see his like again." 
Today almost everyone-economists, investors, and the 
general public alike-seems to have swerved to the 
opposite extreme. The Fed controls not only inflation, 
they seem to think, but also everything else that hap-
Today almost 
pens to the American economy, good or bad. The truth, 
however, is somewhere in the middle. 
We are not arguing that Greenspan's policies were 
perfect. Nor should anything that follows be construed 
as a defense of central banking or of the Federal 
Reserve. Particularly alarming is the way the lender-
of-last-resort function has been 
expanding the moral-hazard safety net 
and mispricing risk-trends to which 
Greenspan no doubt contributed. Our 
ideal would combine abolition of the 
Fed and unregulated free banking. 
Nonetheless Alan Greenspan stands 
out as the most competent-arguably 
the only competent-helmsman of U.S. 
monetary policy since creation of the 
Federal Reserve System. As Milton 
Friedman observed on Greenspan's 
retirement, "For the first 70 years after 
it opened in 1914, the Fed did far 
more harm than good, presiding over 
inflation in two World Wars, converting 
a moderate recession into the great 
everyone seems to 
think the Fed 
controls not only 
inflation but also 
everything else that 
happens to the 
American economy, 
whether good or bad. 
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depression, and then, in the 1970s, producing the most 
serious peacetime inflation in our nation's history." By 
contrast, Greenspan's "performance has indeed been 
remarkable." 
Greenspan oversaw relatively low and stable inflation 
and ushered in a striking decline in the volatility of real 
gross domestic product. Although defenders of macro­
economic intervention often suggest that government 
policies after World War II dampened business cycles, 
the truly significant change should be dated at 1987, 
the year Greenspan assumed office. The current fuss 
about a recession that, according to standard indicators, 
still is no worse than the minor recessions of 1990 and 
2001 testifies to how high his legacy has raised the bar. 
Until a year or so ago many observers 
had therefore credited Greenspan with 
being the best at reading the eco­
nomic tea leaves. But as we will 
demonstrate, the source of Greenspan's 
apparent success has little to do with 
monetary discretion. 
Freezina Total Reserves 
R ecently-converted critics are now charging Greenspan with 
having carried on an excessively 
expansionary monetary policy, partic­
ularly following the recession of 2001 
and possibly during the dot-
com boom that preceded it. But an objective examina­
tion of his record of nearly two decades shows that 
he did not. Instead, however unintentionally and 
unwittingly, he came close to freezing the domestic 
monetary base and deregulated the broader monetary 
aggregates. 
Why do people now believe Greenspan was an 
"inflationist"? For one main reason: They note how 
low interest rates were from 2002 through 2004. But 
interest rates have never proved an adequate gauge of 
what the Fed is doing-not during the Great Depres­
sion, when rates were very low despite a collapsing 
money stock; not during the Great Inflation of the 
1970s, when rates were high despite an expanding 
money stock; and not under Greenspan. A focus on 
interest rates ignores the simple fact that interest rates 
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can change as a result of real factors involving supply 
and demand and are not simply "set" by the Fed. 
The market ultimately determines interest rates. 
While central banks are big enough players in the loan 
market (and the quintessential noise traders to boot) 
that they can push short-term rates up or down some­
what, that ability is increasingly diminished-even for 
a major central bank like the Fed-as globalization 
integrates world financial markets. In defending his 
actions, Greenspan is correct in attributing the unusu­
ally low interest rates early this decade mainly to a mas­
sive flow of savings from emerging Asian economies 
and elsewhere. 
A better, although now unfashionable, way to judge 
monetary policy is to look at the 
monetary measures: MZM, M2, M 1, 
and the monetary base (see chart, 
p. 36). From 2001 to 2006 the annual 
year-to-year growth rate of MZM 
fell from over 20 percent to nearly 0 
percent. During that same time M2 
growth fell from over 10 percent to 
around 2 percent and M 1 growth fell 
from over 1 0 percent to negative 
rates. Admittedly the Fed's control 
over the broader monetary aggre­
gates has become quite attenuated, 
for reasons elucidated below. But 
even the year-to-year annual growth 
rate of the monetary base since 2001 fell from 10 per­
cent to below 5 percent in 2006. When all these meas­
ures agree, it suggests that monetary policy was not all 
that expansionary during 2002 and 2003 under 
Greenspan despite the low interest rates. 
The key to what was really going on is the mone­
tary base, which the Federal Reserve controls directly. 
The base consists of reserves held by the banks and 
other depositories, either in their accounts at the Fed or 
as vault cash, plus currency in circulation among the 
general public. Between December 1986-eight 
months before Greenspan became Fed chairman-and 
December 2005, the monetary base rose by a hefty 
amount, from $248 billion to $802 billion (no figures 
are seasonally adjusted). True, that doesn't sound like a 
freeze. But virtually the whole increase was in currency 
Why do people now 
believe Greenspan 
was an "inflationist"? 
For one main reason: 
They note how low 
interest rates were 
from 2002 through 
2004. 
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Money Definitions 
Ml: currency in circulation, travelers' checks, 
and transaction deposits (accounts that permit 
unlimited checking). 
M2: M1 plus savmgs deposits, small time 
deposits, money-market deposit accounts, and 
retail money-market mutual fund shares. 
M3 (which the Fed ceased reporting in March 
2006): M2 plus bank-issued repurchase agree­
ments, Eurodollar deposits held by U.S. residents 
in foreign branches of U.S. banks, large certifi­
cates of deposit (over $100,000), and institu­
tional money-market mutual fund shares. 
MZM (Money of Zero ·Maturity and reported 
only by the St. Louis Fed): M2 minus small time 
deposits plus institutional money-market mutual 
fund shares. 
in circulation. (See the graph of the monetary base and 
its two components on p. 37.) During that same time 
total bank reserves grew from $65 billion to $73 billion, 
for an average annual growth rate of a mere 0.65 per­
cent. (These figures are unadjusted for any changes in 
reserve requirements and-unlike the somewhat mis­
leading reserve totals reported by the Fed's Board of 
Governors-include all vault cash, clearing balances, 
and float.) In some years aggregate reserves rose; in oth­
ers they fell, with the major bump surrounding Y2K, 
when the accumulation of reserves by banks appears to 
have induced the Fed to accommodate a 40 percent 
jump followed by a 30 percent drop. Total reserves are 
also the one monetary measure whose growth rate 
shows a slight uptick into 2003, when interest rates 
were down. But that is thin backing for the extravagant 
accusations that "easy Al" was conducting an excep­
tionally expansionary monetary policy. 
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Currency in Circulation 
During the same 19 years, currency in circulation exploded faster than the monetary base-at an 
annual rate of 7.54 percent. Before this explosion cur­
rency was less than three-quarters of the total monetary 
base; by the end of Greenspan's tenure it was over 90 
percent. In a period when debit cards and possibly 
ATMs were reducing currency demand, analysts were 
aware that all this new cash was not bulging in the wal­
lets and purses of the average American. It was going 
abroad as a stable dollar evolved into an international 
currency. These growing foreign holdings of Federal 
Reserve notes became an additional factor increasing 
money demand and keeping U.S. inflation in check 
during the 1990s. 
Ideally we should adjust the monetary base and 
monetary aggregates downward to account for this 
drain abroad. Richard G. Anderson of the St. Louis Fed 
estimates that the proportion of U.S. currency held 
abroad doubled between 1986 and 2005, from 25 to 
nearly 50 percent. Although his estimates may be too 
low, the Fed makes no such adjustment. Doing so 
would reduce the average annual growth rate of the 
monetary base between December 1986 and Decem­
ber 2005 from 6.4 to 4.9 percent. 
Furthermore, in a fully deregulated monetary sys­
tem, private banks-not the Fed-would be the insti­
tutions issuing currency. Currency would become an 
additional bank liability like deposits and respond to 
market forces. In our current system, the public still 
determines how much of the base becomes currency in 
circulation by their decisions to withdraw and redeposit 
cash. The Fed controls only the total base whereas cur­
rency passively expands to accommodate people's pref­
erences. This suggests that a more meaningful 
approximation of the base would be simply to subtract 
all currency in circulation, leaving us with only aggre­
gate reserves as our proxy. Thus the virtual freezing of 
reserves turns out to be the most salient yet ignored 
feature of Greenspan's tenure. Interestingly, the late 
Milton Friedman had recommended in the 1980s 
something similar to what Greenspan did de facto: 
freeze the base. 
Greenspan also helped deregulate the broader mon­
etary aggregates: M2, MZM, and M3. The Depository 
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The Monetary Base, 1979-2008 
Since the total monetary base and currency in circulation increased in line with one another, total reserves were more or less frozen under Greenspan. 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 
1980 had begun phasing out interest-rate ceilings on 
deposits and modified reserve requirements in complex 
ways. Combined with later administrative deregulation 
under Greenspan through January 1994, these changes 
left all the financial liabilities that M2 adds to M 1-sav­
ings deposits, small time deposits, money market 
deposit accounts, and retail money-market mutual fund 
shares-utterly free of reserve requirements and 
allowed banks to reclassifY many M 1 checking accounts 
as M2 savings deposits. M2 and the broader measures 
became quasi-deregulated aggregates with no legal link 
to the size of the monetary base. 
A result noted by Milton Friedman in 2003 is 
that fluctuations in the velocity of M2 were offset by 
37 
fluctuations in the amount of M2. Interestingly, this is 
similar to what monetary economists George A. Selgin 
and Lawrence H. White predicted would happen 
under free banking-or a market-determined mone­
tary system void of government involvement. They 
argued that free banking would automatically adjust 
the quantity of money to changes in velocity. If 
velocity rose, signaling a fall in money demand, mar­
ket mechanisms would cause banks to reduce the 
quantity of money they created. And if velocity fell, 
signaling a rise in money demand, banks would enlarge 
the quantity of money. The response of M2 to changes 
in velocity in the 1990s offers stunning confirmation 
of this claim. The result was that inflation was held in 
check. 
MARCH 2009 
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Thus during the dot-com boom of the 90s the 
velocity of M2 rose as people shifted into stocks. But 
this was offset by the declining growth rate of M2, 
which fell to near zero between 1994 and 1996. 
Assorted Fed watchers reached opposite conclusions 
depending on which variable they chose to focus on. 
Some warned that Greenspan's policies were deflation­
ary. Others looked at the higher growth rates of the 
base and M 1, which remains more closely tied to the 
base and more distorted by currency going abroad, and 
predicted higher inflation. Both were wide of the mark, 
of course, but not because of Greenspan's miraculous 
central-bank discretion. The result was a product of the 
market process, and when the collapse 
of the dot-com boom burst the M2 
velocity bubble it induced a new 
spike in M2 growth. 
Why Any Inflation? 
I f Greenspan approximately froze total reserves, why was there any 
inflation at all during his tenure? 
Rather than averaging 2.5 percent 
annually, shouldn't pnces have 
remained constant or actually fallen? 
Indeed, in a thoughtful critique of an 
earlier version of this article, Selgin 
denied that the broader monetary 
measures were responding to changes 
in velocity, since productivity growth 
would have therefore generated just 
such a gradual deflation. The answer 
relates to the market's extraordinary 
capacity for financial innovation. 
Until the recent, extraordinary changes in Fed opera­
tions, bank reserves in the United States paid no inter­
est, giving banks a strong incentive to economize on 
their use and maximize lending. They figured out ways 
to do so even under reserve requirements, as amply 
illustrated by the origins and growth of the Federal 
funds market, where banks regularly lend each other 
excess reserves. 
Financial deregulation gave the process an additional 
boost. From December 1986 to December 2005-the 
same period during which aggregate reserves remained 
almost constant-the aggregate de facto reserve ratio of 
the banking system as a whole backing M2 fell by half, 
from 2.52 percent to 1.23 percent. So the quantity of 
M2 deposits grew at a secular rate of 4.6 percent, 
enough to generate mild, sustained inflation. And the 
quantity of domestically held currency grew alongside at 
an accommodating rate. 
This steady, long-term decline of reserve ratios can­
not easily be halted and confronts government fiat 
money with a fatal long-run problem. Re-tightening of 
reserve requirements would only burden banks with an 
implicit tax not faced by other financial institutions, 
encouragmg the development of new, highly liquid 
money substitutes that effectively 
avoid the requirements. Congress has, 
moreover, moved in the opposite 
direction, permitting the Fed to elim­
inate all remaining reserve require­
ments in 2011, thereby bringing the 
United States into line with such 
countries as Australia, New Zealand, 
Canada, the United Kingdom, and 
Sweden, which have already done so. 
True, the Fed has now started paying 
interest on bank reserves, which has 
enormously increased demand for 
them in the short run. Nonetheless 
banks will still be able to earn greater 
interest on loans and securities under 
normal economic circumstances. 
Moreover, paying interest on reserves 
in effect transforms that portion of 
the monetary base into Treasury secu-
rities payable in fiat money, rather 
than genuine fiat money itself. 
In short, the ongoing spread of electronic funds 
transfers and assorted cashless payments is essentially 
replacing money with a sophisticated network of com­
puterized barter. The demand for fiat money will thus 
approach zero asymptotically. So long as the money 
base is built on a fiat foundation with no other source 
of demand, the price level will slowly but inexorably 
head toward infinity. Only a commodity base with a 
nonmonetary demand-say gold, although it could just 
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more complex basket of commodities or financial 
assets-will anchor the price level over the long haul. 
Under free banking, the expansion of monetary substi­
tutes would drive down the demand for gold-as­
money, but gold's value can never drop below its 
commodity value. Gold would continue to provide the 
unit of account, the common numeraire in nearly all 
transactions, without ever needing to be used as a 
medium of exchange. 
Greenspan cannot be held responsible for this ulti­
mate unviability of fiat money, although his deregula­
tion accelerated the inflationary bias. A steady, secular 
contraction of total reserves could in theory have offset 
the declining reserve ratio, delivering 
a constant price level or even secular 
deflation over the last two decades. 
But the continued fall of base-money 
demand is itself inevitable as long as 
developed economies wish to capture 
the enormous welfare gains of finan­
cial innovation and a more efficient 
allocation of savings. 
An Ironic Legacy 
So what did cause the current financial crisis? That is similar to 
asking what caused the minor recessions of 1990 and 
2001. Unlike the cause of inflation the cause of business 
cycles is not obvious, which is why economists still vig­
orously debate the question. Minor blips in total 
reserves under Greenspan may have played some poorly 
understood role in any of these three events. Because 
Greenspan only imperfectly implemented Friedman's 
rule of freezing the monetary base, without intending 
to do so, his policy may have ended up slightly too dis­
cretionary. But that possibility hardly justifies the "asset 
bubble" hubris of those economic prognosticators who, 
only well after the fact, declaim with absolute certainty 
Was Money Really Easy Under Greenspan? I 
and scant attention to the monetary measures how the 
Fed could have pricked or prevented such bubbles. 
The misunderstanding of Alan Greenspan's manage­
ment of the U.S. money stock has an ironic coda. 
Before his appointment the Federal Reserve had 
proved so palpably inept as to all but discredit discre­
tionary monetary policy. Both monetarist rules and free 
banking were gaining adherents among economists. 
But today, despite the recent financial turmoil, most 
interpret Greenspan's record as showing either that dis­
cretionary policy can be done right or that what is 
needed is some activist pseudo-rule such as that devel­
oped by John B. Taylor of Stanford University. Central 
bankers, after half a century or more 
of failure, have allegedly learned from 
their past mistakes. Finally, according 
to this view, they have the knowledge 
to plan the money stock properly. 
In a review of Greenspan's mem­
oirs Harvard economist Benjamin 
Friedman claims that Greenspan was 
a practitioner par excellence of mone­
tary discretion (despite paying lip 
service to laissez faire) and that 
Greenspan's major failing was that he 
was not more of a regulator. Fried­
man is wrong on both counts. Greenspan, like the Wiz­
ard of Oz, was a lousy wizard-but he was a good 
deregulator. And that made all the difference. His suc­
cess stemmed from weakening Fed discretion with the 
unintentional approximation of a rigid monetary rule 
and the very deregulation that Benjamin Friedman 
deplores. Rather than demonstrating that monetarist 
rules are obsolete and free banking unnecessary, 
Greenspan's policies suggest that the more thoroughly 
either of those two objectives is implemented, the 
greater the macroeconomic stability our economy will 
e~o~ 
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